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1Abstract
This paper explores the optimal interaction between the tax system and social assistance
in insuring people against the risks of involuntary unemployment and low ability. To that
end, we introduce search unemployment in a model of optimal non-linear income taxation. The
relationship between welfare bene¯ts and the optimal level of in-work bene¯ts is U-shaped. This
explains why in-work bene¯ts are called for both in countries that grant low welfare bene¯ts and
countries that provide high welfare bene¯ts. An earned-income tax credit optimally induces all
agents to look for work if job search is cheap and e®ective, agents are not very risk averse, and
the least-skilled agents are relatively productive.
Key words: search, in-work tax bene¯ts, unemployment compensation, redistribution, risk
aversion.
Journal of Economic Literature Classi¯cation Numbers: H21, J64, J65
1. Introduction
In recent years many industrialized countries have employed tax policies to encourage unem-
ployed persons to seek work. Following the example of the United States, several European
countries have introduced or are considering in-work tax bene¯ts in the form of an Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC). More generally, by lowering taxes on low-skilled work, governments
increasingly stimulate low-skilled workers to look for jobs. These policies are part of the so-
called 'welfare-to-work' strategy, where governments ¯ght poverty by raising employment of
low-skilled workers rather than by increasing welfare bene¯ts for these workers.
To investigate the optimal interaction between tax policies and welfare payments, we in-
troduce unemployment risk in a model of optimal non-linear income taxation in which agents
2feature heterogeneous abilities. In such a setting, social assistance is required to insure risk-
averse agents against the risk of becoming unemployed. At the same time, by redistributing
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, a non-linear income tax protects these agents
against the risk of being born without many skills. Indeed, inequities originate not only in
heterogeneous abilities (as in [13]) but also in di®erences in employment status.
In introducing search unemployment in an optimal tax model, we focus on the case in
which the government can verify a worker's ability. We adopt this informational assumption
for four main reasons. First, it allows us to explore the arguments for in-work tax bene¯ts in
circumstances that are favorable to these tax subsidies. As argued below, in-work bene¯ts are
most attractive if the participation constraint rather than the incentive compatibility constraint
for work e®ort is binding for high-ability agents. The second reason for our informational
assumption is that this allows us to clearly identify how search incentives restrict the ability
of the government to redistribute resources away from the most productive workers towards
agents with lower consumption levels. Without the intensive decision margin (i.e. the selection
of work e®ort after having found a job), only the search margin (i.e. the extensive decision
margin or participation constraint) constrains redistribution. A third reason for assuming
that types are observable is that it allows us to interpret high public bene¯ts for low-ability
households as disability bene¯ts with which the government tags low-ability agents (see [1]). In
this interpretation, the search costs are the information costs associated with the government
verifying the ability level of these low-ability agents. The ¯nal reason for our informational
assumption is that it simpli¯es the analysis and is a ¯rst step towards exploring a more complex
model in which the intensive and extensive margins interact (see [4]). Indeed, our model is
closely related to the small optimal tax literature that incorporates the endogenous decision to
participate in the labor market but abstracts from endogenous labor supply on the intensive
margin (see [5], [6] and [9]).
3Our analysis is based on a special utility function in which leisure enters utility in a linear
fashion. Whereas these preferences are more speci¯c than the more general preferences in [5],
[6], and [15], the additional structure on preferences allows for more analytical results. This
sheds additional light on the determinants of the optimal tax schedule. Indeed, a substantial
literature (see, e.g., [2], [7], [12], and [16]) has turned to quasi-linear preferences in leisure in
order to obtain more intuition for the determinants of the optimal non-linear income tax. These
preferences imply that a utilitarian government cares about the distribution of consumption
rather than the distribution of work e®ort. Our approach is thus closely related to [11], who
note that policy debates focus on raising consumption rather than reducing the work e®ort (or
raising leisure) of the poor. [11], however, adopt a non-welfarist social welfare function. We, in
contrast, continue in the welfarist tradition, but assume a special, quasi-linear utility function.
A ¯nal reason for adopting this particular utility function is that it clearly illustrates the
importance of the search margin in constraining the redistributive powers of the government.
In the absence of the search margin, the government engages in extreme redistribution if it can
observe a worker's ability: only the most skilled worker exerts work e®ort, as the distribution
of work is determined by e±ciency rather than equity considerations. We show that the search
margin excludes this extremely redistributive policy.
We study issues similar to those explored by [15], who incorporates two labor-supply margins
in an optimal tax model: namely, not only hours worked (the intensive margin) but also
the participation decision (the extensive margin). Although the search margin in our model
resembles the extensive margin in the model of Saez, and our model is close to the version of the
Saez model in which work e®ort on the intensive margin is exogenous, our model di®ers from
Saez' approach in two important respects. First, in the Saez model, agents voluntarily choose
not to participate in the labor market. In our model, in contrast, agents are exposed to the
risk of being involuntarily unemployed; agents thus face two risks: being born with low ability
4and being involuntarily unemployed. Second, our model, which puts more structure on the
participation margin, is more explicit than [15] about the labor-market imperfections a®ecting
the costs and e®ectiveness of labor-market search. This facilitates the welfare analysis of these
imperfections and allows us to explore the optimal interaction between social assistance and
non-linear income taxation as instruments to insure agents against the two risks of low ability
and involuntary unemployment.
In our setting, we explore how the government can best address these two reasons for poverty
(i.e. low skills and involuntary unemployment). Should the government rely mainly on welfare
payments rather than on in-work bene¯ts, or should it o®er in-work tax bene¯ts that exceed
welfare bene¯ts? Generous social assistance helps those who are poorest (i.e. the unemployed),
but harms incentives to look for jobs. In-work bene¯ts do not su®er from this latter drawback,
but are less well targeted at those most in need. Moreover, in-work bene¯ts for low-ability
agents distort the hours that agents choose to work on the intensive margin by making it more
attractive for high-ability agents to mimic lower ability agents. If the government can observe an
agent's ability, however, the incentive compatibility constraint on hours worked can be ignored
and the participation constraint (i.e. extensive margin) is binding also for high-ability types.
We show that in that case (in which the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding),
in-work bene¯ts tend to be generous compared to welfare bene¯ts. In fact, the government
may ¯nd it optimal to o®er in-work bene¯ts that exceed optimal welfare bene¯ts, even though
the unemployed are poorer than agents with a job. The reason is that social assistance is a
relatively ine®ective way to ¯ght poverty because it bene¯ts not only the poorest but also the
richest agents. In particular, if welfare bene¯ts are increased, the government must reduce
taxes on the most e±cient agents in order to prevent these high-ability workers from leaving
the labor market. The associated adverse distributional e®ect of reducing taxes for the richest
agents may outweigh the bene¯t of alleviating poverty among the unemployed.
5We also explore the case in which the government can optimize only the tax system and has
to take the level of social assistance as given. Indeed, in practice, taxes and social assistance
are often set by di®erent agencies based on rather distinct considerations. Alternatively, one
can view our analysis as exploring how the tax system can be employed to address the possibly
sub-optimal aspects of social assistance. The relationship between exogenous social assistance
and optimal in-work bene¯ts appears to be U-shaped. As welfare bene¯ts are raised from a
low initial level, these bene¯ts absorb the budgetary room for generous in-work bene¯ts as
an instrument to ¯ght poverty. At low levels of social assistance, therefore, welfare bene¯ts
and in-work bene¯ts are substitutes in ¯ghting poverty. As welfare bene¯ts are increased
further, however, the participation constraint for marginal workers becomes binding and the
government needs to raise in-work bene¯ts to draw people out of unemployment into work.
At high levels of social assistance, therefore, in-work bene¯ts and social assistance become
complements: in-work bene¯ts help to o®set the impact of higher social assistance bene¯ts on
the participation constraint. This U-shaped relationship between in-work bene¯ts and welfare
payments reveals that generous in-work bene¯ts are called for in countries with low welfare
bene¯ts and in those with high welfare bene¯ts, but for di®erent reasons. In countries with
relatively low levels of social assistance (such as the United States), in-work bene¯ts are aimed
at poverty alleviation. In countries with generous social assistance (such as most Western
European countries), in contrast, in-work bene¯ts protect the incentives to participate in the
labor market. The distinct comparative static e®ects of larger welfare bene¯ts correspond to
a distinction between so-called low welfare and high welfare economies, both of which feature
voluntary unemployment but for di®erent reasons.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. After section 2 formulates the model, section
3 sets up the optimization problem for the government and discusses the optimality conditions.
Section 4 introduces two benchmark cases in which either both the search and work-e®ort
6margins constrain distribution or neither does. This sets the stage for the main analysis in which
only the search margin limits redistribution. Under this informational assumption, section 5
explores optimal tax policy if welfare bene¯ts b are set exogenously. We can interpret this case
as the tax authorities optimizing the tax system, taking the welfare system as given. The case
in which the government can simultaneously optimize the tax and social assistance systems is
investigated in section 6. This section shows that a low welfare economy can emerge in this
setting, thereby generalizing a result in [5]. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are contained in
the appendix.
2. Model
Consider an economy with agents who feature heterogeneous skills. A worker of ability (or
skill) n working y hours (or providing y units of work e®ort) supplies ny e±ciency units of
homogeneous labor. With a linear production function featuring a constant unitary labor
productivity, these e±ciency units are transformed into the same number of units of output.
We select output as the numeraire. Hence, the before-tax wage per hour is given by the
exogenous parameter n: Overall gross output (or gross income) z(n) amounts to z(n) ´ ny(n):
The density of agents of ability n is denoted by f(n); while F(n) represents the corresponding
cumulative distribution function. The support of the distribution of abilities is given by [n0;n1].
Workers exhibit homogeneous tastes. In particular, they share the following quasi-linear
utility function over consumption x and hours worked (or work e®ort) y :
u(x;y) = v (x) ¡ y;
where v0 (x) > 0;v00 (x) < 0 for all x ¸ 0 while limx#0 v0 (x) = 1 and limx¡!+1 v0 (x) = 0.
The concavity of v(:) implies that agents are risk averse and thus want to obtain insurance
7against the risks of unemployment and low earning capacity n. The speci¯c cardinalization
of the utility function a®ects the distributional preferences of a utilitarian government. In
particular, the concavity of v(:) implies that a utilitarian government aims to ¯ght poverty of
both unemployed and low-ability agents.
As in [2], [7], [12] and [16], work e®ort y enters the utility function in a linear fashion. This
has two major consequences. First, consumption x is not a®ected by income e®ects. A higher
average tax rate thus induces households to work more rather than to cut consumption. Second,
a utilitarian government cares only about overall work e®ort and not about the distribution of
work e®ort over the various agents. Such a government thus aims at an equal distribution of
consumption (i.e. the alleviation of poverty) rather than an equal distribution of work e®ort
and welfare.
Instead of working with work e®ort y(n) and consumption x(n) as the instruments of the
worker, we ¯nd it more convenient to write the utility function in terms of gross income (or
output) z(n) ´ ny(n) and net income (or consumption) x(n): Utility of type n is then written
as u(n) ´ v (x(n)) ¡ z(n)=n:
Agents have to search for a job. In particular, by searching with intensity s 2 [0;1]; agents





°s if s 2 [0; ¹ s]
+1 otherwise,
where ¹ s < 1 captures the idea that agents can fail to ¯nd a job, even if they search at full
capacity ¹ s. If an agent does not succeed in ¯nding a job, (s)he receives a welfare bene¯t b ¸ 0;
which the agent takes as given. Since the government cannot observe the ability of unemployed
agents, the welfare bene¯t does not depend on n: An agent of ability n thus selects search
1This formalization of the search margin in a static framework is similar to the one-period search model in
[8].
8intensity s to maximize expected utility
U(n) = max
s
f¡°(s) + su(n) + (1 ¡ s)v (b)g:
Substituting the search cost function ° (s) introduced above, one can easily verify that the





0 if u(n) < ° + v (b)
¹ s if u(n) ¸ ° + v (b):
(1)
The government has to satisfy its budget constraint, which states that aggregate tax rev-
enues should equal the sum of aggregate welfare bene¯ts and exogenously given exhaustive
government expenditure g :
Z n1
n0
f (n)s(n)T (n)dn = b
Z n1
n0
f (n)(1 ¡ s(n))dn + g; (2)
where T (n) = z (n) ¡ x(n) denotes the tax paid by type n if this type ¯nds work.
The utilitarian government maximizes ex-ante expected utility (i.e. expected utility before





f (n)[¡°s(n) + s(n)u(n) + (1 ¡ s(n))v (b)]dn: (3)
In optimizing the objective function, the government is able to verify a person's ability n
after that person has found a job. As long as a person remains unemployed, however, the
government cannot observe the ability of that person. By ¯nding a job, a person thus reveals
his ability. Hence, in contrast to social assistance, the tax system can discriminate across types.
3. The optimal tax problem
This section introduces the main ingredients for characterizing the optimal tax schedule if the
government cannot observe agents' search e®ort but is able to observe the ability of workers.
9We ¯rst rewrite the government's optimization problem by using two observations. First, due
to the linearity of the cost function ° (s); an agent should either search full time ¹ s or not
at all (i.e. s = 0). Second, the highest ability types should work and therefore search for a
job because these types are most e±cient and thus feature the lowest labor costs. These two
observations imply that the government selects a marginal type ns 2 [n0;n1] such that types
n < ns do not search, while all types n ¸ ns search at full capacity. We can thus formulate the
optimization problem of the utilitarian government as follows:
max
ns;x(:);z(:)













f(n) + ¸Ef(n)¹ s[z (n) ¡ x(n)]
¡´ (n)
³








¡¸E fb[F (ns) + (1 ¡ F (ns))(1 ¡ ¹ s)] + gg;




¸ v (b) + ° and ´(n) ¸ 0;
´ (n)
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for all types n ¸ ns whom the government wants to search and
Z n1
ns




f(n)¹ s[z (n) ¡ x(n) + b]dn ¡ b ¡ g
¶
= 0
for the government budget constraint. Here, ´ (n) and ¸E represent the Lagrange multipliers
for the participation constraint and the government budget constraint, respectively.
104. Setting the stage: two benchmark cases
This section explores two benchmark cases that set the stage for our main results in which the
government can observe ability but not search. In particular, after investigating the case in
which neither the search margin nor the intensive decision margin (i.e. the selection of work
e®ort y after having found a job) limits redistribution, we explore the case in which both these
margins constrain the ability of the government to redistribute resources.
4.1. No search
In order to understand the impact of the search margin on the optimal tax system, this sub-
section explores the case in which the search margin is absent (i.e. ´ (n) = 0). In that case,
all work should be performed by the most productive type n1 so that marginal production
costs ¸E are determined by the marginal labor costs of this type (i.e. ¸E = 1=n1).2 All types
feature the same consumption level ¹ x determined by v0(¹ x) = ¸E = 1=n1: Intuitively, given
the linear speci¯cation of the disutility of work e®ort c(y) = y, e±ciency rather than equity
considerations determine the distribution of work e®ort. Hence, all labor should be performed
by the most e±cient workers (i.e. the workers of type n1): In contrast to the distribution of
work e®ort, the distribution of consumption a®ects social utility in view of the concave nature
of the utility of consumption v(x): In particular, the government prefers an equal distribution
of consumption, with the uniform consumption level being determined by the costs of supplying
labor by the most e±cient type n1 (i.e v0(¹ x) = 1=n1): Whereas the distribution of consumption
is thus equal, the distribution of utility is highly unequal, as the most e±cient workers perform
2To see why this holds, note that work e®ort z(n) enters the optimization problem (4) in a linear way.
If search is observable (as well as type), the Lagrange multiplier ´ (n) = 0 for all types n. Hence, it becomes
optimal to concentrate all production where it is cheapest (i.e. at type n1; where the marginal cost of production
is only 1
n1).
11all of the work. Indeed, the government levies a highly progressive tax T(n1) on these types,
inducing these workers to produce su±cient resources for providing a consumption level ¹ x to
all other agents. The non-negative tax level T(n1) is determined (from the government budget
constraint (2)) by the costs of granting tax subsidies (i.e. ¡T(n) = ¹ x) to all types n < n1:
To exclude this extreme solution, this paper assumes that the government cannot verify
search. In that case, the search margin prevents the government from shifting all work e®ort to
the most productive type. In particular, having the most skilled type perform all work e®ort
would discourage this type from looking for such a demanding job. In this way, the participation
constraint u(n) ¸ v (b) + ° prevents the government from exploiting the most e±cient types
through an extremely redistributive tax system. Hence, work e®ort must be distributed more
equally over the population.
4.2. Unobservable skills
In order to understand the conditions under which a search subsidy is optimal, we consider the
case in which the government cannot verify working agents' skills. The optimal tax structure
for this case is analyzed in [4], but here we are interested only in the sign of T (n) + b. The
following result shows that search is necessarily taxed if the government cannot observe workers'
ability.
Proposition 1 If the government cannot observe workers' ability and b is optimally set, then
ns > n0 implies that
T (n) + b > 0
for each n ¸ ns.
If the government cannot observe workers' ability, then any feasible tax system has the
property that in-work utility rises with ability (i.e. u0 (n) > 0). For all non-marginal workers
12n > ns; u(ns) ¸ ° + v (b) together with u0 (n) > 0 implies that u(n) > ° + v (b) for n >
ns; so that the participation constraint is binding only for the marginal worker ns. For the
non-marginal workers, the incentive compatibility constraint for work e®ort rather than the
participation constraint is binding.
The reason why search should be taxed (i.e. T(n) + b ¸ 0) can be stated as follows. The
participation constraint u(n) ¸ ° + v (b) implies that consumption of workers exceeds the
consumption of the unemployed. Hence, compared to in-work bene¯ts, social assistance is a
more e®ective way to ¯ght poverty because welfare bene¯ts accrue to the poorest agents. Since
the participation constraint is binding only for the marginal worker ns; the only e±ciency cost
of more generous welfare is that it harms the incentives of marginal workers to search for a
job. In the optimum, therefore, the government balances the positive marginal distributional
bene¯ts of social assistance with positive marginal e±ciency costs. Accordingly, the marginal
external e®ect on the government budget constraint of the marginal worker ns looking for a
job should be positive (i.e. T (ns) + b ¸ 0): Non-marginal workers are taxed even heavier (i.e.
T(n) > T(ns) for n > ns) in view of the redistributive preferences of the government, so that
the tax on search, T (n)+b; is positive for all workers. Below we show that this result no longer
holds if the government has information about workers' skill.
5. The optimal tax system with search and observable types
This section turns to the case in which the government can observe ability but not search and
faces an exogenous welfare bene¯t b.3 An important element in characterizing the solution for
3For this exercise to be useful, g should not be so high that the government budget constraint cannot be met
even without any welfare bene¯ts (i.e. b = 0). De¯nition 2 in the appendix formally de¯nes the upperbound
on g such that positive welfare bene¯ts can be ¯nanced. Throughout this paper g is assumed to lie below this
13n0 ns nz
n1
search s(n) > 0 and
work z(n) > 0
search s(n) > 0
but do not work





Figure 1: Form of solution to optimal tax problem.
the optimal tax problem is the least e±cient type ^ n that searches for a job (i.e. u(^ n) = v(b)+°)
without a net search subsidy (or subsidy on work). This type ^ n satis¯es the following equation:
v (x(^ n)) ¡
x(^ n) ¡ b
^ n
= v (b) + °; (5)
where x(^ n) is the optimal consumption level for type ^ n in the absence of taxes and subsidies:








Hence z (^ n) = x(^ n) ¡ b and thus (using z (n) = x(n) + T (n)) T (^ n) + b = 0. De¯nition 1 in
the appendix provides a more formal characterization of ^ n. Types n > ^ n search for a job even
if the government does not subsidize search. Less e±cient types n < ^ n, in contrast, must be
paid a search subsidy to induce them to look for a job.
The solution to the optimal tax problem (4) takes a form as shown in ¯gure 1. In particular,
a type ns ¸ n0 exists such that the lowest skills n 2 [n0;ns] do not search for a job (i.e. s(n) = 0)
and draw social assistance. Another type nz ¸ ns exists such that skills n 2 hns;nz] search for
a job (i.e. s(n) = ¹ s) but do not work in their jobs (if they ¯nd one), i.e. z (n) = 0. They enjoy
a positive government transfer ¡T(n) > 0 ¯nancing the consumption level x(n) = ¹ x; where ¹ x
is the ¯rst-best consumption level for type nz, i.e. ¹ x = argmaxx
n




highest skills n 2 hnz;n1] search for a job (i.e. s(n) = ¹ s) and work positive hours if they ¯nd
a job. In particular, production z (n) for these types is chosen such that these skilled workers
upperbound.
4¡T (n) > b for these types n 2 hns;nz] because v (¹ x) ¸ v (b) + ° and positive search costs (° > 0) imply
¹ x > b and hence T (n) + b = ¡¹ x + b < 0:
14are indi®erent between searching for a job and staying unemployed:
z (n) = n[v (x(n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ °];









We can now formulate the solution to the optimization problem (4) with an exogenous level
of social assistance b as follows.
Proposition 2 For given g and density function f (:) on [n0;n1], values b;¹ b exist with 0 · b ·
¹ b < +1 such that for b 2 [0;bi , the optimal tax system results in a so-called low welfare [LW]
economy with ns = n0;nz > ^ n and T (nz) + b > 0;
for b 2 [b;¹ b]; the optimal tax system results in a so-called high welfare [HW] economy with
ns 2 [n0; ^ n];nz = ^ n and T (nz) + b = 0;5
and for b > ¹ b the government budget constraint cannot be ¯nanced.
We ¯rst discuss the properties of the solution that hold in both the low welfare [LW] and
high welfare [HW] economies before we turn to the properties that di®er across these two
economies. In both the low welfare and high welfare economies, a set of agents optimally
searches for a job (and pays search costs in the process), even though these agents do not exert
any e®ort in their jobs (i.e. z(n) = 0).6 The reason why costly search for a job is optimal
even though workers do not produce anything is that workers reveal their ability if they ¯nd
5The choice of the interval [ns;nzi in the solution for the high welfare economy above is somewhat arbitrary.
Any other (set of) subinterval(s) of [n0;nzi with the same mass of agents is a solution as well.
6The reader may wonder why the government cannot observe the ability of unemployed agents but does
observe the ability of employed agents working zero hours. In fact, these latter agents work " > 0 hours, but
the government minimizes " so that it can just uncover a worker's type. We assume, in fact, that " is in¯nitely
small.
15a job. This additional information has social value because it allows the government to better
target its policy instruments aimed at poverty alleviation at the least skilled, most deserving,
types by providing in-work bene¯ts that are explicitly aimed at these types. In-work bene¯ts
are a relatively e±cient means to ¯ght poverty because, in contrast to social assistance, these
bene¯ts do not harm the search incentives of the more skilled types and therefore do not reduce
the rents that can be extracted from the high skilled. Jobs are thus an e®ective way to get less
skilled people out of poverty even though these agents do not produce anything in their jobs.
The relative e±cacy of in-work bene¯ts as a poverty-¯ghting instrument compared to welfare
bene¯ts explains why a search subsidy (i:e: T(n)+b < 0) is optimal for some people (although
these people do not provide work e®ort if their job search is successful). This search subsidy
resembles an EITC: agents collect higher public transfers in work than in unemployment. In
other words, the marginal tax rate on searching for a job is negative.
We can interpret the jobs in which agents do not produce anything (i.e. z(n) = 0) as dis-
ability insurance.7 In this interpretation, the search costs correspond to the costs of uncovering
the information about the ability level of low-ability agents n < nz: Indeed, it does not matter
for the optimal allocation whether the costs of tagging these agents are paid by the government
directly or indirectly (i.e. by having to pay agents a su±ciently high in-work bene¯t to induce
these agents to search for a job). We thus can interpret the search subsidies as disability ben-
e¯ts. In that interpretation, it seems most natural to provide these bene¯ts to the agents with
the lowest ability rather than to the more able agents [ns;nzi.
5.1. The low welfare economy
In a low welfare economy, the government can a®ord to pay relatively generous search subsidies
to all agents who do not search for a job without such a subsidy. Instead of welfare bene¯ts,
7Another interpretation of these jobs is workfare for agents who are not productive enough to earn high
wages in the private sector. High-ability agents are not eligible for these jobs.
16therefore, an EITC insures agents against the risk of being born with low ability.8 Jobs (with
in-work bene¯ts) rather than welfare bene¯ts are thus the preferred route out of poverty due to
low productivity. Social assistance insures people only against the risk of remaining unemployed
after having actively searched for a job. This risk of involuntary unemployment (i.e. 1 ¡ ¹ s) is
the same for all skills. Indeed, social assistance is paid only to the population share 1 ¡ ¹ s that
is involuntarily unemployed ( i.e. those unfortunate agents who looked for a job and thus paid
search costs, but nevertheless did not ¯nd one).
In the low welfare economy, the government budget enjoys a surplus if the government
extracts the participation rents from all types that search without a net subsidy n > ^ n (z (n) =
n(v (x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b))), while at the same time providing not only welfare bene¯ts to the part
of the population 1 ¡ ¹ s that has not found work but also tax subsidies in the form of an EITC
that allow all other types who found work to enjoy the same consumption level as the marginal
worker ^ n without having to exert any work e®ort (i.e. ¡T(n) = x(^ n) > b for n < ^ n): What
is the optimal strategy for spending this surplus at a given level of welfare b? In view of the
concavity of v (:); the marginal utility of consumption is highest for the marginal worker ^ n
(and for all the types n < ^ n who bene¯t from net search subsidies ¡(T(n) + b) > 0)). The
government would thus like to employ the surplus to raise the consumption level of this worker.
However, providing the marginal worker ^ n with more consumption reduces the marginal utility
of consumption v0 (x(^ n)) below the marginal utility costs of providing labor by this type, 1=^ n:
Accordingly, the marginal worker ^ n is better-o® if the government reduces his work time z(^ n)
to zero instead of giving him more consumption. The government therefore utilizes the surplus
8In a low welfare economy, those born with low ability are better o® (in terms of utility) than the more
skilled types, but enjoy lower consumption levels. In a high welfare economy, in contrast, insurance against
low ability is less e®ective since some agents with low ability do not bene¯t from generous in-work bene¯ts and
must rely instead on relatively low unemployment bene¯ts instead. This still makes them as well-o® (in terms
of utility) as the most skilled.
17to increase not only the consumption level ¹ x for all types that exert no work e®ort (by raising
the EITC and thus the search subsidy ¡(T(n)+b)); but also the number of fortunate types who
do not have to exert e®ort in their jobs. Hence, the surplus is spent by both raising the level
of the search subsidy and the number of people who are eligible for it. The government thus
pays search subsidies also to people who would search for a job even without search subsidies.
As a direct consequence, the marginal worker is taxed on search (i.e. T (nz) + b > 0 as shown
in proposition 2). Intuitively, the government can a®ord to distort the search margin for the
marginal worker nz because all agents search (i.e. ns has a corner solution). Indeed, the search
margin is not binding for the marginal worker.
The government continues to spend its surplus in this way until the government budget
constraint holds with equality. When spending the surplus, the government ensures that the
marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal labor costs for the lowest type that exerts
e®ort (i.e, v0 (¹ x) = 1
nz where nz is the marginal worker).
5.2. The high welfare economy
In the high welfare economy, the government cannot a®ord to pay search subsidies to all types
[n0; ^ ni who are not productive enough to look for a job without search subsidies. As a result,
a subset of these types [n0;nsi is not paid in-work tax bene¯ts, so they do not search and
remain unemployed. In a high welfare economy, therefore, the tax system (by paying in-work
tax bene¯ts in the form of an EITC) cannot fully protect less able agents against poverty. Also
social assistance plays a role in insuring agents against the risk of being born with low ability
n:
The subset [ns;nzi who are paid an EITC, ¡T(n) > b, without having to exert any e®ort
in their jobs enjoy the highest utility level of all types.9 Since v (x(n)) ¸ v (b) + ° for all
9The utility level of the low-ability agents who do not search [n0;nsi corresponds to that enjoyed by the
18n ¸ ns; we have that x(n) > b for n 2 [ns;nzi: Substituting the Taylor expansion v(b) =
v(¹ x) + v0(¹ x)(b ¡ ¹ x) + 1=2v00(»)(b ¡ ¹ x)2 (and noting that v0(¹ x) = 1=^ n)) into (5), we ¯nd that
° = ¡1=2v00(»)(¹ x¡b)2: Hence, in deciding whether to provide one more search subsidy and thus
relying more on the tax system rather than welfare bene¯ts in ¯ghting poverty, the government
faces a trade-o® between saving on the costs of search ° and ¯ghting poverty by reducing
the costs of unequal consumption levels (which are directly related to the concavity of utility
v(:)): Large search costs ° imply that the agents have to pay relatively large costs to reveal
their type by ¯nding a job.10 This makes the tax system a relatively expensive instrument to
redistribute resources: relatively large search subsidies are required to induce agents to reveal
their type. Encouraging more agents to search thus becomes less attractive. A concave utility
function, in contrast, implies that unequal consumption levels ¹ x and b become costly. Hence,
the government ¯nds it attractive to ¯ght poverty by taking people out of unemployment by
paying them a relatively high in-work tax bene¯t ¹ x = ¡T(n) > b:
For the marginal worker nz; the in-work bene¯t corresponds to the welfare bene¯t so that the
search subsidy goes to zero (i.e. T (nz) + b = 0 in proposition 2). Search thus does not impose
any ¯rst-order welfare e®ects, as the government pays this worker the same in unemployment
and work: search is neither taxed nor subsidized. In other words, the marginal tax rate on
search is zero and the search margin is not distorted. In contrast to the case without observable
ability (see Proposition 1), the government can a®ord to eliminate the search distortion because
it does not have to worry about generous in-work bene¯ts for less skilled workers distorting the
most productive types hnz;n1] who have found jobs in which they exert positive work e®ort. The consumption
level of the unemployed, however, is lower than that of the more productive types who have found jobs. In
terms of utility, the higher consumption level of these latter types is balanced by higher work e®ort and search
costs.
10Lemma 9 in the appendix shows that, in the absence of search costs (i.e. ° = 0), all agents should search
(i.e. ns = n0). Accordingly, the tax system (rather than unemployment bene¯ts) insures people against the
risk of being born with low ability.
19intensive margin of more skilled workers.
5.3. Welfare and in-work bene¯ts
This sub-section explores how the optimal tax system responds to exogenous changes in the
welfare bene¯t b.
Proposition 3 An increase in the welfare bene¯t b yields the following e®ects:
[LW] for b 2 [0;bi , dnz
db < 0;
dT(n)
db > 0 for n 2 [ns;nzi with ns = n0,
[HW] for b 2 hb;¹ bi; dnz
db > 0; dns
db > 0;
dT(nz)
db = ¡1 and
dT(n)
db < 0 for n 2 hns;nzi.
In a low welfare economy, higher social assistance raises the number of workers exerting
positive e®ort (dnz
db < 0). The reason is the following. Higher welfare bene¯ts impose two
additional burdens on the government budget. First, they raise the expenditures on social
assistance for the share of the population (1 ¡ ¹ s) that is involuntarily unemployed. Second,
they reduce the tax revenues that can be extracted from the most skilled agents, as these
types now ¯nd it more attractive to rely on the higher welfare bene¯ts rather than searching
for a job. These two additional budgetary burdens reduce the resources that can be spent
on in-work tax bene¯ts. Hence, higher welfare bene¯ts reduce both the level of these search
subsidies (thereby reducing the consumption of the least e±cient agents) and the number of
people who are eligible for these search subsidies (thereby increasing work e®ort for marginal
workers). At the same time, in response to their lower average tax burden, the more e±cient
types who already exerted work e®ort reduce that work e®ort. Work e®ort is thus spread out
more equally over various workers. Intuitively, by tightening the participation constraint of the
most e±cient workers, more generous welfare bene¯ts allow for less redistribution through the
tax system. Indeed, a higher welfare bene¯t pushes the low welfare economy away from the
economy without a search margin (discussed in section 4.1) in which only the most productive
worker provides positive work e®ort.
20In a high welfare economy, in contrast, higher welfare bene¯ts reduce the number of agents
who work positive hours (i.e. dnz
db > 0). Intuitively, higher social assistance raises the produc-
tivity requirements for workers who search without a search subsidy: with a better alternative
option (namely not searching and collecting a higher welfare bene¯t), fewer workers are in-
clined to search for a job in the absence of search subsidies ¡T(n) + b > 0: The lowest type
that searches for a job without a work subsidy must thus become more skilled. Since the











db > 0 for n 2 hns;nz]).
Combining these comparative static results for the low welfare and the high welfare economies,
we ¯nd that the population that exerts work e®ort is largest at the point where a low welfare
economy turns into a high welfare economy. Starting from a low welfare economy, a higher
welfare bene¯t ¯rst reduces the population that can be allowed to enjoy leisure (by paying
them generous in-work bene¯ts). Eventually, a higher welfare bene¯t exhausts the surplus that
can be spent on providing search subsidies to agents who would not search without being paid
such a search subsidy. At that point, the low welfare economy turns into a high welfare econ-
omy. An even higher welfare bene¯t raises the productivity requirements for the worker that
is indi®erent to searching for a job in the absence of a search subsidy. This causes a drop in
the number of workers who exert positive work e®ort. Accordingly, the relationship between
the welfare bene¯t and the number of people who do not exert work e®ort is U-shaped.
Also the relationship between in-work bene¯ts and welfare bene¯ts is U-shaped. At low
levels of social assistance, welfare bene¯ts and the EITC are substitutes in ¯ghting poverty
because higher welfare bene¯ts absorb the budgetary room for generous in-work bene¯ts as an
instrument to ¯ght poverty. At high levels of welfare, however, the participation constraint for
marginal workers is binding and higher welfare bene¯ts induce the government to raise in-work
21bene¯ts for marginal workers and to reduce taxes on more e±cient workers in order to induce
the latter agents to continue to look for work. In-work bene¯ts thus help to o®set the impact
of higher welfare bene¯ts on the participation constraint so that in-work and welfare bene¯ts
are complements. The relationship between in-work bene¯ts and social assistance payments
explains why generous in-work bene¯ts are called for in both countries that grant low and
countries that provide high welfare bene¯ts. In countries with low levels of social assistance
(such as the United States), in-work bene¯ts are used to alleviate poverty. In countries with
high levels of welfare (such as most Western European countries), in contrast, in-work bene¯ts
protect the incentives to participate in the labor market.
6. Optimal welfare bene¯ts
This section turns to the case in which the government can optimally set not only the tax
system but also social assistance. In this setting, it considers two related issues. First, if b is
optimally chosen (instead of exogenously given), does optimal policy produce a high welfare or
low welfare economy? Second, with optimal welfare bene¯ts, proposition 1 in section 4.2 shows
that the government should always tax search (i.e. T (n) + b > 0) if it cannot observe skills.
With observable skills, in contrast, the current section shows that search may be subsidized
rather than taxed (i.e. T (n) + b < 0):
We determine the optimal level of welfare by taking the ¯rst-order condition of (4) with








This equation shows that ¯ghting poverty by using high welfare bene¯ts is constrained by the
participation constraints for the high ability agents n > nz. Hence, the more important these
22participation constraints are, the lower optimal social assistance becomes and thus the more
likely one ends up in a low welfare economy.
The cost of using in-work bene¯ts instead of welfare to ¯ght poverty is that agents have to
invest search costs ° to ¯nd a job and become eligible for in-work bene¯ts. The following result
shows that if search costs are low enough, optimal b implies a low welfare economy.
Proposition 4 If ° = 0; the optimal b implies a low welfare economy. As long as nz < n1; we
¯nd that
T (n) + b < 0
for n 2 [n0;nz].
By having all types search for a job (ns = n0 in a low welfare economy), the government
relies maximally on in-work bene¯ts to relieve poverty. Intuitively, the advantage of in-work
bene¯ts over social assistance as a redistributive device is that these bene¯ts can better target
the least skilled by using more information. This information, however, is not costless: agents
can reveal this information only after having searched for jobs, thereby paying search costs
° ¸ 0: Without these search costs (° = 0), however, in-work bene¯ts have only advantages so
that the government maximally relies on in-work bene¯ts.
The reason why the in-work bene¯t ¡T (n) exceeds the welfare bene¯t b is the participation
constraint for the high e±ciency types. In particular, raising ¡T (n) for the types n 2 [n0;nz]
does not create distortions, while raising b harms work e®ort by high types. Therefore, the
government sets the in-work bene¯t at a higher level than the welfare bene¯t. The following
simple example shows that the result T (n) + b < 0 is also possible with positive search costs.
Example 1 Consider an economy with only two types of agents: n0 = 0 and n1 > 0 with





< ° < v (x);
where x is determined by v0 (x) = 1
n1. In this economy, z0 = y0 = 0 because production by type
n0 does not yield any output. Clearly, the government would like to redistribute from the n1
type to the n0 type. Does this take the form of welfare bene¯ts b or in-work bene¯ts x0? To























+¸E f¡f0s0x0 + f1s1 (z1 ¡ x1) ¡ [f0 (1 ¡ s0) + f1 (1 ¡ s1)]bg






¡ ° ¡ v (b)
¾
:
We derive conditions under which the optimal welfare bene¯t b equals zero, while the in-work
bene¯t x0 is positive. For this, we need only the ¯rst-order conditions for x1 and z1:
f1s1v
0 (x1) ¡ ¸Ef1s1 + ´1v





















Since we want to redistribute as much consumption from type n1 to type n0 as is feasible, type
n1 must work as hard as possible.11 The maximal amount is determined by the search constraint
11The planner, however, should not redistribute so much that x0 > x1. To avoid this, the following condition




f0 < x1: The last inequality is
met due to the assumptions made on °.
24v (x1) ¡
z1
n1 ¸ v (b) + °. Hence, we ¯nd
z1 = n1 (v (x1) ¡ v (b) ¡ °):
If b is raised, then social gains equal
[f0 (1 ¡ s0) + f1 (1 ¡ s1)]v
0 (b);
while the social costs equal the cost of additional expenses on b plus the loss in tax revenue
(which equals f1s1n1v0 (b) because the expression for z1 above implies that
dz1
db = ¡n1v0(b))
¸E ff0 (1 ¡ s0) + f1 (1 ¡ s1) + f1s1n1v
0 (b)g:
If at b = 0 the costs exceed the gains, the optimal welfare bene¯t level equals 0:
¸Ef1s1n1v
0 (0) + [f0 (1 ¡ s0) + f1 (1 ¡ s1)](¸E ¡ v
0 (0)) > 0;
or equivalently (using v0 (0) = +1 and ¸E ¸ 1





The interpretation of this condition is that search should be relatively e®ective.
With observable ability, the participation constraint for high ability types is binding. This
explains why T (n) + b < 0 is optimal in this case, whereas T (n) + b > 0 (see proposition
1 in section 4.2) if ability is not observable. In the latter case, high skilled agents earn an
informational rent. This makes the participation constraint for these types slack. Hence,
welfare, which tightens the participation constraint, does not a®ect the behavior of the high
skilled. At the same time, in-work bene¯ts do a®ect that behavior, as the high skilled may
want to mimic the low skilled who collect generous in-work bene¯ts. Whereas in-work bene¯ts
thus distort work e®ort of high skilled agents, welfare no longer directly impacts the behavior
25of these agents. Accordingly, compared to in-work bene¯ts, welfare becomes a more attractive
instrument for ¯ghting poverty.
A low welfare economy is more likely if optimal social assistance is not generous. In order
to obtain some intuition about when social assistance b is low compared to the in-work bene¯t
¹ x, one can approximate the search subsidy ¡T (n) ¡ b = ¹ x ¡ b by the following expression12













[F (nw) + (1 ¡ ¹ s)(1 ¡ F (nw))]
;
where b < » < ¹ x: This expression indicates that b is low compared to ¹ x if search is e®ective
(as indicated by a high level of ¹ s) and agents are not particularly risk averse (as indicated
by a low coe±cient of relative risk aversion ¡»v00(»)=v0(b)): Intuitively, if not many people
are involuntarily unemployed and the government does not care much about inequality in
consumption, the government sets welfare b at a relatively low level.
We can conclude that a low welfare economy, which minimizes the dependency on social
assistance and uses jobs (and in-work bene¯ts) rather than welfare as a anti-poverty device, is
more likely to be observed if search is cheap (i.e. ° is low) and e®ective (i.e. ¹ s is large), agents
are productive (so that ^ n is close to n0 and the government does not need to pay many agents
a search subsidy to induce them to search for a job), and agents are not particularly risk averse
so that they do not mind poor insurance against unemployment risk.
Whereas we thus establish that in the social optimum an economy may feature low welfare,
[5] ¯nd that their economy is necessarily high welfare if welfare bene¯ts are set optimally.
Chon¶ e and Laroque's result originates in their assumption of a Rawlsian welfare function, which
implies very high risk aversion. If we were to adopt such a Rawlsian welfare function, we would
arrive at the same conclusions as Chon¶ e and Laroque. The reason is that the participation
constraint implies that the worst-o® agent collects welfare bene¯ts. Hence, a Rawlsian social
12This expression can be derived by using the Taylor expansion v0 (¹ x)¡v0 (b) = v00 (»)(¹ x ¡ b) (with b < » < ¹ x)
and substituting v0 (¹ x) = ¸E into equation (25) in the appendix.
26planner maximizes these welfare bene¯ts subject to the government budget constraint. Social
assistance is therefore raised up to the point where a further increase would bankrupt the
economy. This implies that the economy is necessarily high welfare rather than low welfare.
More generally, social assistance continues to play an important role in protecting agents
against lack of skills if search is expensive and ine®ective and if agents are not productive (so that
using the tax system is expensive), especially if agents are risk averse. In that case, high welfare
bene¯ts reduce the budgetary room for paying in-work bene¯ts to the large population that is
not productive enough to search for a job without these generous in-work bene¯ts. In particular,
people must be paid high in-work bene¯ts in order to overcome the search costs for revealing
their type. Moreover, in-work bene¯ts cannot reach those that are involuntarily unemployed
(i.e. those who search but still remain unemployed). Intuitively, work is an expensive and
ine®ective way out of poverty so that in-work bene¯ts are expensive (as search costs are high)
and fail to reach the involuntary unemployed.
7. Conclusions
This paper has explored the interaction between the tax and social assistance systems in insuring
people against the risks of involuntary unemployment and low ability. By assuming that the
government can observe a worker's type, we have stacked the cards in favor of in-work tax
bene¯ts as an instrument to ¯ght poverty. We showed, however, that even with this strong
informational assumption, the redistributive power of the tax system is constrained if the
government cannot verify job search. In particular, the ¯nancing of in-work bene¯ts can be
problematic if search costs are high and a large number of agents is not productive. This is
especially so if high welfare bene¯ts constrain the ability of the government to extract taxes
from the more e±cient workers. In this way, social assistance limits the ability of the tax system
27to ¯nance in-work bene¯ts.
If the government can optimally set both the tax system and the level of social assistance,
it faces a trade-o® in deciding on the relative importance of in-work and welfare bene¯ts.
Relying on in-work bene¯ts allows e®ective targeting of bene¯ts at workers with low ability
without directly distorting the search incentives of more able workers. However, in-work ben-
e¯ts are expensive if search costs are high. Moreover, they do not reach the poorest agents
who su®er from involuntary unemployment. Clearly, social assistance remains important in
insuring agents against unemployment risk. The welfare system continues to play an important
role also in protecting agents against lack of skills if search is expensive and ine®ective and if
agents are not productive. In that case, work is an expensive and ine®ective way out of poverty.
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Appendix: Proofs of results
Proof of Proposition 1
With the government not being able to observe workers' ability, it has to respect incentive
compatibility with respect to individual work e®ort. In other words, given a certain tax schedule
~ T (z) as a function of gross income, workers choose their production to maximize in-work utility
u(x;z) = v
³
z ¡ ~ T (z)
´
¡ z


















where we used the ¯rst-order condition for z. To facilitate the inclusion of Eq. (7) into our
optimization problem, we employ u(n) as control variable instead of x(n); as we did in (4).
The optimization problem thus becomes
max
ns;u(:);z(:)












+ ¸E [f(n)¹ sT(n)]
¾
dn
¡¸E fb[F (ns) + (1 ¡ F (ns))(1 ¡ ¹ s)] + gg
¡´s (° ¡ u(ns) + v(b));






. Furthermore, since z (n) ¸ 0 for each
type, Eq. (7) implies that u0 (n) ¸ 0 so that there is only one type ns for which the restriction
° ¡ u(ns) + v(b) · 0 is binding. In fact, if ns > n0; it must be the case that
u(ns) = ° + v (b):
To see this, note ¯rst that u(ns) < ° + v (b) is not possible as type ns will not exert e®ort s
to ¯nd a job. Also u(ns) > ° + v (b) cannot occur because that would provide an incentive to
a type n < ns (but close to ns) to mimic type ns and ¯nd a job. This would violate incentive
compatibility in terms of search.
The ¯rst-order conditions for ns;u(:) and z (:) can be written as
´su






4¡° ¡ v (b) + u(ns)
| {z }
=0

























The transversality conditions are13
¸u (ns) + ´s = 0; (11)
¸u (n1) = 0; (12)












dn = [F (ns) + (1 ¡ F (ns))(1 ¡ ¹ s)]b + g: (13)
13[10] derive the transversality condition for the case in which the end value of a state variable can be freely
chosen but has to satisfy an inequality constraint. Our condition above is the equivalent of that condition for a
free starting point under an inequality constraint. The intuition is the following. If the constraint is binding, the
Lagrange multiplier is strictly positive ´s > 0; and the shadow value ¸u (ns) is thus negative. In other words,
one would like to reduce u(ns) (as ¸u (ns) < 0), but cannot do so because of the constraint u(ns) ¸ ° + v (b).







¸Ef (n) ¹ s
: (14)






+ ¹ sf (n)(¸En ¡ 1): (15)
We are now set to prove that b+T (ns) > 0. Assume (by contradiction) b+T (ns) · 0. Then,
Eq. (8) implies that ´s · 0; and thus we ¯nd from (11) that
¸u (ns) ¸ 0:
We now consider two subcases: (i) ¸Ens ¡ 1 ¸ 0 and (ii) ¸Ens ¡ 1 < 0; and show that the
result ¸u(ns) ¸ 0 leads to a contradiction in each case.
(i) If ¸Ens ¡1 ¸ 0; then ¸u (ns) ¸ 0 together with Eq. (15) implies that ¸u(n) > 0 for each
n > ns. However, this contradicts the second transversality condition (12) that ¸u (n1) = 0.
(ii) If ¸Ens ¡ 1 < 0, then using ¸u (ns) ¸ 0 together with (12), it must be the case that
there exists ~ n · n1 such that ¸u (~ n) = 0 and ¸0
u (~ n) · 0. The combination of ¸u (~ n) = 0 with
¸0
u (~ n) · 0 implies that
¸E~ n ¡ 1 · 0: (16)
Now we write the ¯rst-order condition for b as
[F (ns) + (1 ¡ F (ns))(1 ¡ ¹ s)]v
0 (b) ¡ ¸E [F (ns) + (1 ¡ F (ns))(1 ¡ ¹ s)] = ´sv
0 (b):
Since our assumption (to be contradicted) that T (ns) + b · 0 implies that ´s · 0, this
equation implies ¸E ¸ v0 (b). Furthermore, the participation constraint (with ° > 0) implies
that x(n) > b for n ¸ ns and thus we must have v0 (b) > v0 (x(n)) for all n ¸ ns. Using the
characterization of ~ n > ns that says ¸u (~ n) = 0 together with Eq. (14), we establish
¸E ¸ v
0 (b) > v




This, however, contradicts Eq. (16) above. Q.E.D.
32De¯nition 1 We de¯ne ^ n as the biggest root to the equation ³° (:;b) = 0; that is,
^ n ´ maxfn ¸ 0j³° (n;b) = 0g; (17)
with
³° (n;b) ´ n(v (x(n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ °) ¡ x(n) + b; (18)
where x(n) is determined by v0 (x(n)) = 1
n.
The following de¯nition gives the upperbound on g such that the government budget con-
straint can be ¯nanced.





f (n) ¹ s(n(v (x(n)) ¡ °) ¡ x(n))dn;
where ^ n is de¯ned in Eq. (17).
Proof of proposition 2
First, we de¯ne the values b and ¹ b. De¯ne b as the solution in b of the following equation:
Z n1
^ n(b)
f (n) ¹ s(n[v (x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)] ¡ x(n))dn + F (^ n(b)) ¹ s(¡x(^ n(b))) = b(1 ¡ ¹ s) + g;
where x(n) is determined by v0 (x(n)) = 1
n and ^ n(b) is de¯ned in Eq. (17). If there is no
solution b ¸ 0 to this equation, de¯ne b = 0. Note that
d^ n(b)
db > 0 for the following reason.
Di®erentiate ³° (n;b) with respect to n and b. This yields




0 (b) ¡ 1) = 0:
Therefore d^ n
db > 0 because v (x(^ n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ ° > 0 and v0 (b) > 1
^ n (the last inequality follows
from b < x(^ n) as shown in the proof of lemma 8 below).
33The left-hand side of this equation is decreasing in b; while the right-hand side is increasing
in b. Hence, if there is a solution to the equation, it is unique.
De¯ne ¹ b as the solution in b of the following equation
Z n1
^ n(b)
f (n) ¹ s(n[v (x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)] ¡ x(n))dn = b(1 ¡ ¹ s[1 ¡ F (^ n(b))]) + g
with x(n) determined by v0 (x(n)) = 1
n. This value of ¹ b is always well de¯ned because (i)
the left-hand side of this equation is decreasing in b (use
d^ n(b)
db > 0 as derived above), (ii) the
right-hand side is increasing in b, (iii) at b = 0 the left-hand side exceeds the right-hand side
by the assumption that g < g¤ (°) (as de¯ned in de¯nition 2 above) and (iv) the right-hand
side exceeds the left-hand side at a value of b satisfying ^ n(b) = n1.
The proposition is proved for the high welfare economy, using a number of lemmas derived
below. Once the solution for the high welfare economy is proved, the extension to the low
welfare economy is straightforward (see also the text in section 5.1).
Lemma 1 If z (n) > 0 for some n 2 [n0;n1]; then z (n0) > 0 for each n0 > n.
Proof. First, consider the optimal level of before-tax income z(n). Observe that the
optimization problem (4) is linear in z (n) with coe±cient
©
¡¹ sf (n) 1




The optimal z (n) is therefore determined as follows:14










z (n) = 0 if ¹ sf (n) + ´ (n) > ¸Ef (n) ¹ sn: (19)










14We cannot have ¡¹ sf (n) 1
n + ¸Ef (n) ¹ s ¡ ´ (n) 1
n > 0 because that would imply (by the linearity of z (:) in
the optimization problem) z (n) = +1 so that z (n) > n(v (x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)): This, however, would violate
the participation constraint.
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The ¯rst-order condition for maximizing (4) with respect to consumption x(:) is given by
















which implies that x(n0) > x(n) because n0 > n. By assumption z (n0) = 0; hence, we get
v (x(n
0)) > v (x(n)) ¡
z (n)
n
¸ v (b) + °;
and thus ´ (n0) = 0, while ´ (n) ¸ 0. However, this implies
¡
1
n0 + ¸E ¡ ´ (n
0)
1
¹ sf (n0)n0 = ¡
1
n0 + ¸E > ¡
1
n




which contradicts inequality (20).




0)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b))
for each n0 > n.




0)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)):
35Then there exists " > 0 such that the alternative function ~ z(n) which equals z (n) everywhere
except for the points n and n0 where ~ z is determined by
~ z (n
0) = z (n
0) + ";




For " small enough, this function ~ z satis¯es all the constraints and ~ z is budget neutral by
construction. It is routine to verify that ~ z yields higher welfare than z.
De¯ne ~ nz as follows
~ nz ´ inf fn ¸ n0jz (n) > 0g:
Then we ¯nd from the results above, (21) and (19), that for each n > ~ nz; it is the case that
´ (n) > 0;






Now turn to the types below ~ nz. Note that the following result does not assume that the set
[ns; ~ nzi is non-empty. We will prove below that the set is in fact non-empty.
Lemma 3 For each n 2 [ns; ~ nzi we have that z (n) = 0 and x(n) = ~ x for some ~ x > 0.
Proof. z (n) = 0 follows from the de¯nition of ~ nz. The result that all these agents get the
same consumption level follows from the concavity of v (:).
Lemma 4 v0 (~ x) = 1
~ nz.
Proof. Suppose not (in two parts):
(i) suppose (by contradiction) that v0 (~ x) < 1
~ nz. This implies that ~ x > x(~ nz) and hence
v (~ x) > v (x(~ nz)) ¡
z (~ nz)
~ nz
¸ ° + v (b):
36Then we can construct new functions ~ x(:) and ~ z (:) that are identical to x(:) and z (:) with the
following exceptions
~ x(n) = ~ x ¡ ";
~ z (~ nz) = z (~ nz) ¡ "
f (n)
f (~ nz)
for some type n 2 [ns; ~ nzi and " > 0 small enough. These functions ~ z and ~ x are budget neutral
and do not violate any constraint (as long as " is small enough) and raise aggregate welfare.
(ii) suppose (by contradiction) that v0 (~ x) > 1
~ nz. Then there exists a type n < ~ nz such that
for some " > 0 we have
v (~ x + ") ¡
"
n
> v (~ x):
That is, the government can raise the utility of this type n without making anyone worse-o®.
Lemma 5 Assume that ns < ~ nz; then v0 (~ x) = ¸E.
Proof. ´ (n) ¸ 0 implies (from (21)) that v0 (~ x) · ¸E: So the question is whether v0 (~ x) < ¸E
is possible. Assume (by contradiction) that v0 (~ x) < ¸E is indeed possible. Then we have
´ (n) > 0 and thus (by complementary slackness and z(n) = 0) v (~ x) = ° + v (b) so that ~ x > b.
Now consider the ¯rst-order condition for maximizing (4) with respect to the least e±cient
type that searches for a job (the so-called marginal searcher ns):
¹ sf (ns)
½
v (b) + ° ¡ v (x(ns)) +
z (ns)
ns
¡ ¸E (z (ns) ¡ x(ns) + b)
¾
= 0; (22)
where we have used that in the high welfare economy the optimal ns is not a corner solution.
In the low welfare economy we do have a corner solution here (ns = n0).
Substituting v (~ x) = ° + v (b) into this equation yields
0 ¡ ¸E (z (~ nw) ¡ ~ x + b) = 0:
37However, this implies that z (~ nw) = ~ x ¡ b > 0; which contradicts ns < ~ nz.
Corollary 1 ´ (n) = 0 for all n 2 [ns; ~ nzi.
Lemma 6 ¸E = 1
~ nz.
Proof. Suppose not (in two parts)
(i) suppose (by contradiction) that ¸E > 1




+ ¸E ¡ ´ (~ nz)
1
¹ sf (~ nz) ~ nz
= 0:
But then there exists n < ~ nz such that ¡ 1
n + ¸E ¡ 0 > 0; which contradicts z (n) = 0.
(ii) suppose (by contradiction) that ¸E < 1
~ nz. Then there exists n0 > ~ nz such that ¸En0 < 1;
which contradicts ´ (n0) = f (n0) ¹ s(¸En0 ¡ 1) ¸ 0 for this type n0 > ~ nz.
Lemma 7 ~ nz = ^ n where ^ n is de¯ned in Eq. (17).
Proof. Substituting z (ns) = 0; x(ns) = ~ x (with v0 (~ x) = 1
~ nz), and ¸E = 1
~ nzinto Eq. (22),
we arrive at
v (b) + ° ¡ v (~ x) ¡
1
~ nz
(¡~ x + b) = 0: (23)
To analyze the solution to this equation, we write the function ³° : R+ £ R+ ¡! R as de¯ned
in Eq. (18) as
³° (n;b) = n(v (x(n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ °) ¡ x(n) + b;





Thus, Eq. (23) boils down to
³° (n;b) = 0
for exogenously given b.
As the next lemma shows, this equation has at most two solutions.
38Lemma 8 For each b ¸ 0, it is the case that
(i) the equation ³0 (n;b) = 0 has a unique solution ^ n ¸ 0 with x(^ n) = b;
(ii) the equation ³° (n;b) = 0 with ° > 0 has exactly two solutions 0 < ^ n1 < ^ n2 with
v (x(^ n1)) < v (b) + °;
v (x(^ n2)) > v (b) + °:
Proof. First, note that ³° is strictly convex in n. This follows from
@³° (n;b)
@n













Second, note that ³° (0;b) = b > 0 (here, we use the assumption that limx#0 v0 (x) = +1),
limn!+1 ³° (n;b) = +1 and that
min
n¸0
³° (n;b) = b ¡ v
¡1 (v (b) + °):
Now consider in turn the cases ° = 0 and ° > 0. If ° = 0, we see that minn¸0 ³0 (n;b) = 0.
So by the strict convexity of ³0, the value ^ n for which this minimum is reached is the unique
solution to ³0 (n;b) = 0. Further, using the ¯rst-order condition
@³0(n;b)
@n = 0 for this minimum,
we ¯nd that v (x(^ n)) ¡ v (b) = 0 or equivalently x(^ n) = b.
Next, consider the case where ° > 0. Then clearly minn¸0 ³° (n;b) < 0, so (using ³° (0;b) =
b > 0 and limn!+1 ³° (n;b) = +1) we have two solutions to the equation ³° (n;b) = 0. At the








= v (x(^ n1)) ¡ v (b) ¡ ° < 0;
and thus v (x(^ n1)) < v (b) + °. Similarly, at ^ n2 the function ³° is upward sloping (again see







Figure 2: ³°(n;b) as a function of n.
Using this result, we continue the proof that ~ nz = nz = ^ n. If ° = 0, Eq. (23) has only one
solution and hence it is indeed the case by de¯nition 1 that ~ nz = maxfn ¸ 0j³0 (n;b) = 0g = ^ n.
If ° > 0, we need the solution to Eq. (23) which features v (x(n))¡° ¸ v (b). That is, we need
the solution ^ n2 in the lemma above. So again we have ~ nz = maxfn ¸ 0j³° (n;b) = 0g = ^ n.
Summarizing, in the high welfare economy we have found that nz = ^ n;¸E = 1=nz. Further,
for types n ¸ nz we see that s(n) = ¹ s;z (n) = n(v (x(n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ °) and v0 (x(n)) = 1
n. For
types n 2 [ns;nzi we ¯nd s(n) = ¹ s;z (n) = 0 and v0 (x(n)) = 1
nz. Finally, for n 2 [n0;nsi we
¯nd s(n) = z (n) = 0 and x(n) = b. Substituting this into the government budget constraint
shows that there exists a value of ns 2 [n0; ^ n] such that the government budget constraint holds
with equality. This follows from the assumption that b lies between b and ¹ b. Similarly, one can
see that b > ¹ b cannot be ¯nanced by the economy.
Because nz = ^ n in a high welfare economy, we know for n > nz that
v (x(n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ ° +
1
n
(¡x(n) + b) > 0; (24)
40where v0 (x(n)) = 1
n. Combining this with z (n) = n(v (x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)) for n > nz; we ¯nd
T (n) + b = z (n) ¡ x(n) + b
= n
½






because of Eq. (24). Similarly, because by de¯nition of ^ n we have
v (x(^ n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ ° +
1
^ n
(¡x(^ n) + b) = 0;
and nz = ^ n, we also obtain that T (nz) + b = 0.
In the low welfare economy, nz > ^ n and z (n) = n(v (x(n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ °) imply T (n)+b > 0
for all n ¸ nz. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
[LW] To ¯nd dnz
db di®erentiate the government budget constraint in the low welfare economy
with respect to b and nz. This can be written as





1 ¡ ¹ sF (nz) ¡
Z n1
nz
f (n) ¹ s(¡nv
0 (b) + 1)
¸
:
Using the results that [v (x(nz)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)] > 0 and ¡nv0 (b) + 1 < 0 (because b < x(n)
implies v0 (b) > v0 (x(n)) = 1















for n 2 [n0;nzi.
[HW] In the high welfare economy nz = ^ n; and ns is determined by the government budget
constraint. Hence dnz
db = d^ n
db > 0; which was shown in the proof of proposition 2.
41The e®ect that dns
db > 0 follows from the government budget constraint as follows:
2
6
4¡f (^ n) ¹ s(^ n(v (x(^ n)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)))
| {z }
>0
¡ ¹ s(F (^ n) ¡ F (ns))
dx(^ n)














= 1 ¡ ¹ s[1 ¡ F (ns)] + v







Hence, we ¯nd that dns
db > 0.
By de¯nition, T (nz) + b = 0 (because nz = ^ n is the least e±cient type that can work



















dnz > 0 (from v'(x(nz)) = 1=nz).
Proof of proposition 4
We use the following lemma.
Lemma 9 For given g < g¤ (0);f (:);n0,n1 and ° = 0, a benchmark value ¹ b > 0 exists such
that
for b < ¹ b we have a low welfare economy;
for b > ¹ b the government budget cannot be ¯nanced;
for b = ¹ b we have a high welfare economy with ns = n0:
In other words, without search costs (i.e. ° = 0); b = ¹ b in proposition 2.
42Proof. In the high welfare economy, everyone works who does not collect a search subsidy:
nz = ^ n where v0 (x(^ n)) = v0 (b) = 1
^ n. The equality x(^ n) = b follows from the proof of lemma 8




f (n) ¹ s(n(v (x(n)) ¡ v (b)) ¡ x(n))dn +
Z ^ n(b)
n0
f (n) ¹ s(¡x(^ n))dn = (1 ¡ ¹ s)b + g:
The left-hand side is decreasing in b because ^ n0 (b) > 0. Furthermore, the right-hand side is
increasing in b. The assumption g < g¤ (0) implies that the left-hand side exceeds the right-hand
side for b = 0. Furthermore, if b satis¯es v0 (b) = 1
n1; the left-hand side is negative. We thus
have a unique point ¹ b > 0 where the equality above holds, namely in a high welfare economy
with ns = n0. If we increase b above ¹ b we can no longer a®ord the welfare bene¯ts and the
economy goes bankrupt. If b < ¹ b; we are in a low welfare economy.
Now return to the claim made in the proposition. To prove the result, we have to show
that a high welfare economy is impossible. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that an
optimal b produces a high welfare economy. In that case, the following equalities hold
^ b = ¹ b;
ns = n0;









where ¹ b is the benchmark value de¯ned in the lemma above. The other equations follow from
the features of the high welfare economy.
Employing the results from proposition 2 (i.e. v0 (x(n)) = 1=n for n > nz and ¸E = 1=nz)
43and the expression for ´ (n) in Eq. (21), we can write (6) as
v









[F (ns) + (1 ¡ ¹ s)(1 ¡ F (ns))]
: (25)
Substituting ¸E = v0 (b) in this equation, we arrive at
v
0 (b) =
1 ¡ ¹ s + ¹ sF (^ n)
(1 ¡ ¹ s) 1
v0(b) + ¹ s
R n1
^ n f (n) 1
v0(x(n))dn
:
Because v0 (x(n)) < v0 (b) for n > ^ n; we have a contradiction, thus ruling out a high welfare
economy.
To prove T (n)+b < 0 for n 2 [n0;nz], ¯rst recall from proposition 2 that consumption x(n)
for these types is determined by v0 (x(n)) = 1
nz. Second, Eq. (6) with nz < n1 and ´ (n) > 0
for n > nz implies that v0 (b) > ¸E = 1
nz. Hence, we ¯nd that T (n) + b = ¡x(n) + b < 0 for
n 2 [n0;nz]. Q.E.D.
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